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Eldred said something unintelligible to Mr. Jones, shut her door, re-started her 
car, and left the parking lot, running over some flower beds on her way. (Trial 
Tr., p.54, Ls.13-17, p.57, L.1 - p.58, L.15.) Mr. Jones again followed Eldred in 
his car, re-contacting the 911 dispatcher to update law enforcement on Eldred's 
route. (Trial Tr., p.58, L.16 - p.59, L.21.) Mr. Jones continued to observe 
Eldred's erratic driving as she drove from Nampa to Middleton, where she pulled 
up to a house, got out of her car and walked into the house. (Trial Tr., p.59, L.2 -
p.67, L.5.) 
At about the same time, Canyon County Sheriffs Office Corporal 
Chamberlain arrived, parked and called to Eldred, "sheriffs department" several 
times as Eldred continued to walk toward and into the house. (Trial Tr., p.66, 
L.12 - p.67, L.18, p.96, L.1 - p.100, L.13.) Corporal Chamberlain followed 
Eldred into the house and found her sitting in a chair. (Trial Tr., p.101, L.1 -
p.102, L.7.) After speaking with Eldred and noting the odor of an alcoholic 
beverage coming from her, as well as observing her glossy and red eyes and 
slurred speech, Corporal Chamberlain asked Eldred to perform field sobriety 
evaluations. (Trial Tr., 103, L.17- p.108, L.25.) After escorting Eldred out of the 
house, Corporal Chamberlain attempted to perform the horizontal gaze 
nystagmus but could not get Eldred to stop leaning against her car and stand in 
the beginning position for the test. (Trial Tr., p.110, Ls.4-23.) As Corporal 
Chamberlain repeatedly tried to administer the field sobriety evaluations, Eldred 
failed to comply with the instructions and became argumentative. (Trial Tr., 
p.110, Ls.12-22.) When Corporal Chamberlain attempted to place her in 
2 
ISSUE 
Eldred states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the State violate Ms. Eldred's right to a fair trial, guaranteed by 
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Article I, § 13 of the Idaho Constitution, by 
committing multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct during the 
closing arguments? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue on appeal as: 
Has Eldred failed to show error, much less fundamental error, in relation to the 
prosecutor's closing arguments? 
4 
evidence" or "implicate[s] other specific rights of the accused such as the right to 
counsel or the right to remain silent." Jg.,_ at 181-82. 
However, "a criminal conviction is not to be lightly overturned on the basis 
of a prosecutor's comments standing alone, for the statements or conduct must 
be viewed in context; only by so doing can it be determined whether the 
prosecutor's conduct affected the fairness of the trial." United States v. Young, 
470 U.S. 1, 11 (1985). Thus, the Court must consider the probable effect that the 
prosecutor's argument "would have on the jury's ability to judge the evidence 
fairly." Jg.,_ at 11-12. 
With respect to prosecutorial misconduct in the context of closing 
argument the United States Supreme Court has stated: 
Isolated passages of a prosecutor's argument, billed in advance to 
the jury as a matter of opinion not of evidence, do not reach the 
same proportions. Such arguments, like all closing arguments of 
counsel, are seldom carefully constructed in toto before the event; 
improvisation frequently results in syntax left imperfect and 
meaning less than crystal clear. While these general observations 
in no way justify prosecutorial misconduct, they do suggest that a 
court should not lightly infer that a prosecutor intends an 
ambiguous remark to have its most damaging meaning or that a 
jury, sitting through lengthy exhortation, will draw that meaning from 
the plethora of less damaging interpretations. 
Donnelly v. DeChristoforo, 416 U.S. 637, 646-47 (1974). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently reiterated the importance of 
reviewing closing arguments in light of their improvisational nature, noting that "in 
reviewing allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [the appellate court] must keep 
in mind the realities of trial." State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165 P.3d 273, 
285 (2007) (quoting State v. Estes, 111 Idaho 423, 427-28, 725 P.2d 128, 132-33 
6 
Prosecutorial misconduct rises to the level of fundamental error if it 
is calculated to inflame the minds of jurors and arouse passion or 
prejudice against the defendant, or is so inflammatory that the 
jurors may be influenced to determine guilt on factors outside the 
evidence. More specifically, prosecutorial misconduct during 
closing arguments will constitute fundamental error only if the 
comments were so egregious or inflammatory that any consequent 
prejudice could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial 
court informing the jury that the comments should be disregarded. 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003) (citations, 
quotations, and brackets omitted). 
Application of the foregoing standards to Eldred's claims of prosecutorial 
misconduct reveals she has failed to establish error, much less fundamental 
error. 
D. None Of The Prosecutor's Statements Eldred Complains Of Were 
Improper, Much Less So Egregious Or Inflammatory That Any 
Consequent Prejudice Could Not Have Been Cured By A Curative 
Instruction 
Eldred claims the prosecutor struck "multiple foul blows" that "amounted to 
fundamental error." (Appellant's brief, pp.5, 7.) The comments that Eldred 
complains of were not improper, much less "foul blows" or misconduct amounting 
to fundamental error. All of Eldred's misconduct claims lack merit. 
1. The Prosecutor Did Not Misstate The Burden Of Proof, Express 
Her Own Belief In Eldred's Guilt Or Make An Impermissible 
Reference To The "Cloak Of Innocence" 
Eldred claims the prosecutor misstated the burden of proof, impermissibly 
expressed her personal opinion regarding Eldred's guilt and imperrnissibly 
referred to the "cloak of innocence" being lifted. (Appellant's brief, pp.8-9.) All of 
these claims fail, as the prosecutor's statements were proper. The comments 
8 
The authority from other jurisdictions relied on by Eldred is largely 
unsupportive of her claim in this case. In People v. Brooks, 803 N.E.2d 626 (Ill. 
App. 2004), for example, the prosecutor simply told the jury, without reference to 
the evidence or having met his burden of proof, that the "cloak of innocence is 
gone." 803 N.E.2d at 630. The Appellate Court of Illinois condemned the 
remarks of the prosecutor in part because "the argument did not indicate that 
after hearing the evidence the defendant was no longer cloaked in innocence." 
803 N.E.2d at 630 (emphasis supplied). In doing so, it distinguished the 
comments made by Brooks' prosecutor with those made by the prosecutor in 
People v. Cisewski, 514 N.E.2d 970 (Ill. 1987). In that case, the Supreme Court 
of Illinois found no error in the prosecutor's closing statement that "[n]ow is the 
time, Ladies and Gentlemen, to remove the cloak of innocence from this 
defendant ... ,", in large part because it considered the prosecutor's comments in 
their entirety and noted that, immediately prior to making this statement, the 
prosecutor exhorted the jury to "consider all of the evidence .... " 514 N.E.2d at 
977. See also People v. Weatherspoon, 637 N.E.2d 651, 657 (Ill. App. 1994) 
("The record read in its entirety shows the prosecutor committed no error by 
relating to the jury that although every defendant comes to trial cloaked with a 
presumption of innocence, the evidence presented in this case lowered the cloak 
to reveal defendant committed the crimes at issue."). 
prosecutor's comment could be misconstrued by a jury ... any ambiguity could 
easily have been remedied on objection by a clarification from the trial court. 
Thus, we will not consider this issue further."). 
10 
discussing the evidence the state had presented that satisfied its burden. (Trial 
Tr., p.218, L.24 - p.225, L.24.) The prosecutor's statements were not improper 
or misconduct. 
Eldred next claims that the prosecutor's statement, in the same set of 
remarks, that "Eldred is guilty" is an improper expression of her own belief in 
Eldred's guilt. (Appellant's brief, p.9.) However, Idaho law is clear that a 
prosecutor may make such a statement when it is based upon the evidence. 
State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 753 n.1, 810 P.2d 680, 691 n.1 (1991), 
overruled on other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 825 P.2d 1081 
(1991). The Idaho Supreme Court further cautioned prosecutors making such a 
statement to take care to avoid interjecting their own personal belief, and "should 
explicitly state that the opinion is based solely on inferences from evidence 
presented at trial." Id. The prosecutor in Eldred's case did just that, first 
providing the context that the state had the burden to prove Eldred's guilt by the 
presentation of evidence, then stating that it had been so proven, and 
immediately discussing the evidence that established Eldred's guilt. (Trial Tr., 
p.218, L.12 - p.226, L.19.) As with the prosecutor's much more emphatic 
statements in State v. Wolfrum, 145 Idaho 44, 175 P.3d 206 (Ct. App. 2007) ("If 
this man is not convicted of perjury, who can be?"), "[n]ot only are the 
prosecutor's statements not fundamental error, they are non-objectionable." 
Wolfrum, 145 Idaho at 49, 175 P.3d at 211. 
Finally, Eldred claims that the prosecutor's statements regarding its 
burden of proof are improper. More particularly, Eldred claims the prosecutor's 
12 
discussion of the state's burden in State v. Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho 199, 75 
P.3d 1209 (Ct. App. 2003): "Romero-Garcia has failed to persuade this Court that 
any misconduct occurred. The prosecutor reiterated what the district court had 
already instructed - that the state bears the burden of proving every element 
beyond a reasonable doubt and that the defendant has no obligation to present 
evidence." Romero-Garcia, 139 Idaho at 203, 75 P.3d at 1213. See also 
Darden v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 182 n.15 (1986) (comments that lead the 
jury to minimize the importance of its role are improper, but where "[i]f anything, 
the prosecutors' comments would have had the tendency to increase the jury's 
perception of its role," no error). The prosecutor in Eldred's case emphasized 
that the presumption of innocence was significant and that the state alone has 
the burden of presenting evidence to remove that presumption. The prosecutor 
did not engage in misconduct. Eldred's claim fails. 
2. The Prosecutor Did Not Misrepresent The Evidence 
Eldred claims that the prosecutor, in her rebuttal closing argument, 
"misrepresented the evidence" when she said that Eldred "refused to blow" when 
the officer administered the BAC test. (Appellant's brief, p.9.) Because the 
prosecutor was entitled to discuss the evidence presented at trial, and the 
reasonable inferences that can be derived from that evidence, the prosecutor did 
not engage in misconduct by these statements. Eldred's claim fails. 
Eldred's closing argument put forth two theories: first, that her erratic 
driving was due to her fright at being followed by Mr. Jones, and second, that her 
.264 BAC was artificially high because the printout from the lntoxilyzer 5000 
14 
And why? Because she didn't want to blow properly. She 
refused to blow properly. 
He would start to get the tone, and then it would drop off. 
(Trial Tr., p.233, L.15 - p.234, L.14.) Deputy Chamberlain testified that when he 
and his backup first attempted to place Eldred under arrest, "she became 
combative." (Trial Tr., p.110, Ls.12-23.) Deputy Chamberlain testified that later, 
when Eldred was asked to blow into the mouthpiece of the lntoxilyzer 5000, "she 
was attempting to blow, but she was doing an exaggerated, you know, cheeks 
puffed out. It looked like she was blowing extremely hard, but the machine was 
indicating to me that it was not receiving." (Trial Tr., p.120, Ls.20-23.) 
The prosecutor's statements were a fair discussion of the testimony and 
the reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. As the Idaho Supreme Court 
has made clear, "[b]oth sides have traditionally been afforded considerable 
latitude in closing argument to the jury and are entitled to discuss fully, from their 
respective standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom." 
State v. Sheahan, 139 Idaho 267, 280, 77 P.3d 956, 969 (2003). The 
prosecutor's statements discussing Corporal Chamberlain's observations of 
Eldred's efforts at providing a breath sample, and the inferences to be drawn 
therefrom, were not improper and did not constitute misconduct. Eldred's claim 
fails. 
3. The Prosecutor Did Not lmpermissibly Appeal To The Jurors' 
Emotions 
Eldred claims that the state attempted to appeal to the juror's emotions 
and urged the jury to convict Eldred "because she could have injured or killed 
16 
She finally takes the Garrity exit, and he stops her, he and 
another car, another citizen, don't even know who he is. He is just 
another average citizen like Mr. Jones. Please, please take the 
keys out of the ignition and put them on the dashboard, and let us 
get you help. 
What is her reaction? She guns it, drives over a flower bed 
at the Wal-Mart, and gets back out on the road. 
She slams on her brakes, throws the car in reverse, and 
comes flying backwards, and then starts driving again. 
And at this point as she drives down Garrity and it turns into 
Can-Ada, there are cars swerving out of the way to miss being hit 
by Ms. Eldred. 
She finally stops in Middleton, reaches down to get 
something and almost falls, gets back into her car and drives to Mr. 
Ashby's house. 
All of this time, the defense would have you believe she is 
scared. It is that fear that is making her drive in a manner that 
could kill somebody. 
(Trial Tr., p.220, L.3 - p.221, L.23.) By this argument, the prosecutor is clearly 
referencing Mr. Jones' testimony that he believed he was saving lives by calling 
911, putting on his flashers to alert other drivers, and following Eldred until law 
enforcement could locate her, as well as his testimony that her driving had 
endangered others on the road. (Trial Tr., p.47, L.20 - p.49, L.10, p.50, L.3 -
p.52, L.5, p.59, L.4 - p.62, L.10.) It was not improper for the prosecutor to refer 
to this evidence during closing argument. See Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 
P.3d at 969 (the parties "are entitled to discuss fully, from their respective 
standpoints, the evidence and the inferences to be drawn therefrom") (citation 
omitted). 
18 
should decline to consider her arguments. State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263, 
923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996) ("A party waives an issue cited on appeal if either 
authority or argument is lacking, not just if both are lacking."). 
Even if this Court considers Eldred's claim of fundamental error, because 
she has failed to establish any error, she has necessarily failed to establish 
fundamental error. Even if this Court finds some of the prosecutor's arguments 
were improper, Eldred has failed to articulate any basis for concluding the 
arguments were so egregious or inflammatory that "any consequent prejudice 
could not have been remedied by a ruling from the trial court informing the jury 
that the comments should be disregarded." Sheahan, 139 Idaho at 280, 77 P.3d 
at 969. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Eld red's conviction. 
DATED this 23rd day of March, 2009. 
Deputy Attorney General 
20 
APPENDIX A 
STATE OF IDAHO vs. SHARON K. ELDRED 
1 MS. KALLIN: Permission to walk about the 
2 well' 
THE COURT: Certainly. 
4 MS. KALLIN: Ladies and gentlemen, I want to 
5 start by thanking you again. I'm sure that each and 
every one of you have other things that you would rather 
be doing this last day and a half, rather than sitting 
8 in this little courtroom in those chairs. I appreciate 
your attentiveness to the facts in this case, and I 1m 
10 sure that Ms. Eldred also appreciates you listening 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
25 Idaho. 
3 
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Two times that would be .16. 
rnree times the legal limit would be ,24. 
Ms. Eldred - .264. Over three times the 
legal limit, 
~;-.,w, J1.1t1ge Petrie has given you some 
instructions with regards to the elements I have to 
7 prove. I would like to take a minute and go through 
8 each of those elements. 
9 That on or about May 5, 2001, we have heard 
10 testimony from every witness that May 5, 2001 is the day 
11 we are talking about, in the state of Idaho. 
12 Officer Chamberlain testified that it did, in 
13 fact, happen in the State of Idaho. 
14 And, for that fact, while the driving may 
15 have started in Ada County, it finished in Canyon 
16 County. 
11 You will remember Mr. Jones' testimony, 
18 David Jones, going from Cole to the interstate, and 
19 driving from the Cole exit behind Ms. Eldred all the way 
20 to the Garrity exit. 
21 And then there is a brief stint at the 
22 Wal-Mart at that new exit. 
23 Then she gets in her car again, and she 
,_., 
.!.!.iVd ,.i.t,,1;:: Ga.rrity as it turns into Can-Ada 1 she goes 
••• i:~-,:!11:...1 t.:r:...•¥, :.H:i::: yoes into Middleton, drives around 
A'--= u..s ..: :_ ;. . - ~,,, , 
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1 Middleton, multiple streets in the town of Middleton, 
2 ultimately ending up on Hawthorne, 
3 
4 
5 
6 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
~tl1}~·;"·~ '' 
22 
23 
24 
25 
6 
1 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
19 
20 
21 
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tqget something and 'almost falls/ gets 'back lrito her '/ 
c~r'and drives tH''i,i't'Yfsiii\'y"shouse··.·. .. 
· Ail of this ti~e, the defense would have you 
22 believe she is scared, It is that fear that is making 
23 her drive in a manner that could kill somebody. 
24 It. is that. i2ar that. is uto.kiny nc!. :.J..r~ve _,; a. 
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STATE OF IDAHO vs. SHARON K. ELDRED 
----------:-:---:-,----,--,-----::-:-,---,-----,-,--, 1 from Dave Laycock at the state lab, .26 is approximately 
2 12 drinks in the average body at the time of the test. 
J Does this look like what we are talking 
4 about? 
5 Mr. Laycock went on to say how those drinks 
6 got there. 
7 We don't know. We don't know. We don't know 
8 how much she drank that day. We don't know how much she 
9 had before she got in her car and got on the.interstate, 
10 and backed up traffic a half mile back. 
11 What we do know is that she certainly never 
12 had time to consume that drink. And even if she had, 
13 this is not the result we would have. 
14 Ladies and gentlemen, each and every one 
15 of you came into court today with your conman sense, 
16 You didn't leave it in your car, and you didn't leave 
11 it back in the jury room. I am asking that each and 
18 every one of you use that conunon sense, and find 
19 Ms. Eldred guilty of driving under the influence. 
20 Thank you. 
21 THE COURT: Ms. Reynolds. 
22 MS. REYNOLDS: Permission to move about the 
23 well' 
24 THE COURT: Sure. 
25 MS. REYNOLDS: Jury members, I know it's been 
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1 a long couple o.f days. I know you are tired and want to 
2 go home, but I'm glad you came. I'm glad you paid 
3 attention during the whole trial, and I hope you make 
4 the right decision today. 
5 My closing statement will make reference to 
6 various facts admitted .into eyidence ... and ,t,estified to. 
r~~~mkiiiiiii¥i'kg£4,)~.~fif~?k6~rt·~h~X~i~Jiri-~~~'.i~t~-~~-f' to 
8= 'the best of my ability and my recollection. If your 
9 recollection is different from mine 1 please use your own 
10 recollection. 
11 We have heard testimony from all the 
12 witnesses today and the last couple of days, and it is 
13 up to you as jury members to determine their 
14 credibility. As individual persons, you know how 
15 to determine credibility. You know when someone is 
16 telling the truth, and when someone is a good or bad 
11 witness. 
Our first witness was Mr. Jones. ~ll?J~~~f' 
rtf~ij~\l.~i#f 
.. II(i~ 1tti~::1i!i~t;i;~{~;;~it:J';;j:;');J· 
Mr. Jones proceeded to tell us that he 23 
24 followed a car, staying one to two car-lengths behind it 
2 5 l0&U~1~$~[t'f~til.&¾tli~t~JW,fil)!~£,9R:/JJ!£~£)l~k!l'~t 
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3 He said this took two hours, a two-hour drive' 
4 for this 18 miles to happen. 
5 He also testified that there was a procession 
6 of cars almost a mile long behind this car with flashing 
1 lights, and everyone was staying back. Yet, somehow in 
8 this two-hour interval, not one police officer showed up 
until she arrived at the other house. 
10 I hope that makes you think about Mr. Jones' 
11 credibih tt:1®1f i'1;,ii:Mfilolifl~~,:ii;/jlllJ!lt;~b~~:\¥,¥{~'!,~ft~ · 
12 '."'.". 'O''·'·i:t·.·.·~r.!J.·it.- · ~§~.~_, .. r,.,., .. , .. c·"·-,?-;,,,0,.0,,·,.-':r,., i--·,¢;.• ·.r,u,etc..,,··-.-
13 ,, ... ·, ... ,, Additionally, Mr. Jones could not understand 
14 why someone would be terrified that a car was following 
15 a driver for 1 I guess, two hours for the entire drive 
16 through this small town of Middleton with the twists and 
17 turns to get through the residential streets. He could 
18 not understand why my client, Ms. Eldred, would be 
19 ;p;~)t;f.,M~.~. :~::-;.f .. ?;-.·.&_.~-;g1,·me·,,~,, ~.-.ie.t}.'l.5'½±~~~B:T-Ji;~\~.: t closelji~f&ift, 20 "'Ee'1\l!llinq'Jl:lreJi,}wmili'f"1il!ey~'.'iian'.tedf and Billowing her, and 
21 following her. And then parking outside the house when 
22 she arrives at a safe place, and remaining outside the 
23 house for some time. 
24 When asked, Mr. Jones did not recall any 
25 smell of intoxicating substance coming from Ms. Eldred 
228 
1 when he had contact with Ms. Eldred. 
2 He did not testify he saw beer cans or vodka 
3 bottles rolling around the car. 
4 He did not testify as to any potential 
5 intoxicating substance that she had on her person, in 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
11 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
her car, on her breath 1 anything along those lines. 
CQ!~ii;if ill\:;f f t~r 1: ' .. :, >Ci,,c~~~'tiV' 
p{o~iilily ·draw from your· 0111: "*P"~l~nte:•{~l\1{~11\,ihe 
a8aafu~~&f¥~fh,f.~~-~~:~3/~'.~~:~,.~~~g;;f_~it~,{~~ 
Mr. Ashby did testify that Ms. Eldred's car 
wasn't running very well. That he had difficulty 
navigating it when he drove it. 
Mr. Ashby, who does know my client well, he 
testified that she appeared sober when she arrived, 
although terrified. She was terrified. She was asking 
him about the car that was following her. She wanted to 
know if it had connections with the break-ins a: ;;.,:r 
house, 
To calm her nerves, Mr. Ashby poured a coffee 
cup, that we have all been looking at, the coffee cup of 
vodka, which she pro~tly consumed to soothe her nerves, 
to calm her down. 
Mr. Ashby testified that roughly 10 to 15 
minutes later, the officer showed up at the house. 
229 
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de~~s%~~;i~~~~~;~G~:~fh~;_:.i1gd"~!f~~!f;~~~~:?:1e lS 
no"ti\'a'it:accuz:ate tead~ng; 
That's not the testimony I heard, And, in 
fact, that 1 s not consistent to what is printed on 
the breath slip, A deficient sanq,le is highest 
·,9iff,;;~:);Jan 't~f ~~f'tiiE! tong; 
s·"'•Jieynolds is right, though. There was not 
any signs of alcohol in her car. 
Are there signs of alcohol in cars when 
people go to the bar to drink? 
Are there signs when people drink at their 
house? 
We don 1 t know how much she drank 1 and we 
don 1t know how it got there? 
What we do k.now is that she was driving under 
the influence on May 5, 2007. 
And Ms. Reynolds talked some about the tape, 
234 
1 Does she sound like a .26, or is her tolerance 
2 something that Ms. Reynolds asked multiple witnesses 
3 about? Is her tolerance at a level that she can 
4 function at a .26' 
5 The law sinq,ly says if you are above a .08, 
6 you are under the influence of alcohol. 
7 Ladies and gentlemen, beyond a reasonable 
8 doubt does not mean beyond all doubt, Nothing can be 
9 proven beyond all doubt. But this case is sinq,ly beyond 
10 a reasonable doubt. 
11 Beyond a reasonable doubt, she was driving 
12 under the influence on that day. 
13 Beyond a reasonable doubt, she is guilty of 
14 that crime, Thank you, 
15 THE COURT: Thank you, Madam Clerk, at this 
16 time I am going to ask you to draw one number, This is 
17 the Court's version of a lottery, and this is the deal: 
18 You are going to coordinate with the bailiff on where 
19 you can be contacted, whoever the individual is whose 
20 number is drawn, hopefully you have a hard line number 
21 and a cell phone number, or at least one of those 1 so 
22 that we can contact you to say, You know 1 one of those 
23 strange events have happened, and we need to have you 
24 come back and help this jury decide the case because one 
25 of the jurors had to go home sick - heaven forbid - but 
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some circumstance like that. That 1s why we have the 
alternate juror in case there is an emergency. 
S0 1 implied in that -- in fact, it 1s not 
inq,lied, lam going to tell you right now -- whoever the 
person is, the alternate juror drawn, that gets to leave 
now1 still may not discuss this case with anyone else or 
form or express an opinion about this matter, or decide 
the case until we give you the call, 
That 1s why we need your nuroher 1 so we can 
call you right away and say, We have a verdict and this 
was the verdict. 
When you get that call, then you can say, 
Hey, honey, guess what I have been doing the last two 
days. Alright' Until you get that call, don't be 
saying, Hey, honey, about anything that was going on. 
Alright' 
You say 1 Hey, honey, how come you didn 1 t mow 
the lawn' 
Does that make sense? 
I wish I had a drum roll, Madam Clerk, will 
you draw the number. 
THE CLERK: 133, 
THE COURT: 133, Wait, wait, You will yet 
some parting gifts from the bailiff before you leave. 
Now, the rest of you, you are going to go 
236 
1 back to the jury room to deliberate, 
2 You will have at the outset those two 
3 exhibits that are there at the witness 1 stand. 
4 We have the other exhibit out here, So, 
5 Madam Clerk, we will need to lock the door. 
6 And if you need to hear that recording -- in 
7 fact, I 1m going to have you take possession of that so 
8 that if they need to hear that recording, let us know 
9 and we will all come back here, 
10 So the bailiff will have possession of that 
11 exhibit, you will have the other two, the paper 
12 exhibits, if you will, plus the verdict form, and the 
13 official pen for recording your decision. 
14 You will also have the instructions that 
15 I just gave you, sinq,ly called, Instructions to the 
16 Jury. 
17 And then way back yesterday, if you can 
18 remember back that far -- I have difficulty with that, 
19 maybe you can -- the general instructions, And you will 
20 say, We heard those, Judge. 
21 Well, that's right, but general instruction 3 
22 had the definition of reasonable doubt. You can review 
23 them all if you want, but the one for purposes of 
24 deliberation that you may find useful is the instruction 
25 on what the standard is for reasonable doubt. 
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